Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume VIII: 1990 by Julia Annas
By Julia Annas
Quantity VIII of this acclaimed annual booklet comprises contributions from Andr? Laks, Hugh G. Benson, Cynthia A. Freeland, Stephen White, David Gallop, Salim Kemal, Mark L. McPherran, Eric Lewis, David Bostock, and Elizabeth Asmis.
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Additional info for Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume VIII: 1990 (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy)
Not only to active reason, but also to reason in general. It follows therefore that the subject of this sentence must be human reason in general. Thus, according to their interpretation, this chapter treats at first the active and the potential reason (450a 10-19), then turns to the opposition between actual knowledge and potential knowledge or human reason (19-22), and finally returns to the problem of human reason in general. But it is far from being divine thinking. Thus t'l 'twL Xp6'1lJ) corresponds to t'l 't"lJ)8!
Why then should such a faculty be active, while imagination is passive? Isn't reason in the proper sense, from which these faculties get the name of reason, man's receptive reason? Which of the two acts more directly upon receptive reason? Is it not imagination directly, and active reason only indirectly? Brentano admits that imagination is acted upon by active reason. Then it is evident that active reason is called reason only through being related to human reason, but never until then and by itself.
740-742. 151 Met. XII. 7. 1072 b 14-16; ibid. J(e:L '1:0 e:o ~v 'I:'I>8t ~ ~v '1:'1>8(, ciAA' ~v IIA'I> 'l:LVt '1:0 &pL